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NOTE
DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF UNITED STATES V.
HENSLEY: LIMITING THE USE OF TERRY STOPS
FOR COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS
Rachel S. Weisst
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Hensley,1 a case of first impression, a unanimous
Supreme Court announced the rule that, "if police have a reasonable
suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person
they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a com-
pleted felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspi-
cion."2 By expanding the scope of the doctrine set forth in Terry v.
Ohio,3 Hensley strengthened the power of police officers to make war-
rantless stops of individuals, with less than probable cause, if they be-
lieve that those individuals pose a threat to themselves and/or the
public. Prior to Hensley, the Court's decisions merely sanctioned Terry
stops of individuals who the police suspected were about to commit a
crime or were committing a crime at the time of the stop.4 Thus, by
authorizing Terry stops for already-completed felonies, Hensley ex-
tended the scope of the Teny doctrine, further empowering police of-
ficers patrolling the streets.
Although explicitly broadening the boundaries of Terry to apply
to stops for completed felonies, 5 the Court in Hensley declined to ad-
dress whether the Terry balancing approach similarly applies to stops
for completed misdemeanors.6 Without guidance from the Court, lower
t B.A., The George Washington University, School of Media and Public Affairs, 2006;
J.D., Cornell Law School, 2009. Thank you to all of my colleagues on the Cornell Law
Review who inspired and assisted me throughout this process. A special thanks to Naushin
Shibli, Brendan Mahan, Mike Zuckerman, Jonathan Stroble, Brad Flint, Sapna Desai, and
Michael Page. Most of all, I would like to thank my parents, brother, and friends for their
unwavering support.
1 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
2 Id. at 229.
3 "Teny doctrine" refers to the rule that the U.S. Supreme Court set forth in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which I discuss in further detail in Part I.
4 See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227 (citing, among other cases, Adams v, Williams, 407 U.S.
143 (1972), and Teny, 392 U.S. at 1).
5 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229.
6 Id. ("We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to investigate allpast
crimes, however serious, are permitted.") (emphasis added).
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federal and state courts have attempted to answer this question on
their own; in doing so, they have diverged on the issue. I begin this
Note by providing a background of the case law discussing this open
question, as well as analyzing and evaluating the rationale underlying
these federal and state courts' approaches. Following a thorough dis-
cussion of the significant decisions on the issue, I then argue that
courts should not extend the decision in Hensley to apply to com-
pleted misdemeanors. Instead, courts should use a modified per se
rule prohibiting Terry stops for all completed misdemeanors, with an
exception for the most dangerous moving vehicle violations qualifying
as misdemeanors.
Part I provides background on the Supreme Court's decisions
leading up to Hensley and then briefly discusses the facts and holding
of Hensley. Part II examines the federal circuit court cases that have
addressed the issue of Hensley's application to stops for completed mis-
demeanors. It also briefly discusses the state court decisions that have
taken a stance on the question. Part III argues that a per se rule
prohibiting Terry stops for completed misdemeanors respects the
traditional distinction between misdemeanors and felonies, as well as
promotes society's interest in personal security and privacy. Part III
also explains why a dangerous-driving exception to the per se rule is
necessary and justified.
I
BACKGROUND: SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against "unreasona-
ble searches and seizures" and requires "probable cause" for the issu-
ance of warrants. 7 Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Terry v. Ohio, the Court had continuously held that proba-
ble cause was necessary and required for a warrantless search or
seizure to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment.8 In Terry, the
Court created an exception to this traditional probable cause require-
ment when it held that a police officer may "stop-and-frisk" an individ-
ual if that officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is at
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 Tery, 392 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[P]olice officers up to today have
been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within
their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause. At
the time of their 'seizure' without a warrant they must possess facts concerning the person
arrested that would have satisfied a magistrate that 'probable cause' was indeed present.")
(emphasis omitted).
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hand." By creating such an exception, the Court inserted a "reasona-
bleness" standard into its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.10
The Tery case arose when a police officer patrolling the streets
noticed suspicious behavior and decided to investigate the situation. 1
Upon doing so, the officer patted down the suspicious individuals and
uncovered pistols on two of the three men involved.' 2 At trial, the
judge denied a motion to suppress the uncovered pistols, and defen-
dant Terry was ultimately convicted.1 3 The Ohio intermediate appel-
late court affirmed Terry's conviction, 14 and the Ohio Supreme Court
dismissed his appeal.15 The U.S. Supreme Court then granted Terry's
petition for certiorari.
On review, the Court held that "swift action" based upon "on-the-
spot observations of the officer on the beat" is not subject to the War-
rant Clause of the Fourth Amendment; rather, the Fourth Amend-
ment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures governs the situation.1 6 Thus, a police officer may seize an
individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on "specific
and articulable facts,"1 7 that criminal activity is at hand. If, after iden-
tifying himself as a police officer and making reasonable inquiries in
an attempt to dispel his initial suspicions, the officer continues to be-
lieve that the individual is armed and dangerous, "he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him."18
9 Id. at 20 (distinguishing the conduct in question from conduct involving the War-
rant Clause, instead testing the conduct against the Fourth Amendment's general proscrip-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures).
10 See id.; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) ("The essential
purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reason-
ableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforce-
ment agents, in order 'to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions ....') (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)); Heather
Winter, Resurrecting the "Dead Hand" of the Common Law Rule of 1789: Why Terry v. Ohio Is in
Jeopardy, 42 CRIM. L. BumL. 564, 567 (2006) ("The Supreme Court eschewed probable
cause ... [and] conclude[d] that police officers only have to demonstrate reasonable
suspicion to justify a stop and patdown search ('stop and frisk').").
11 Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.
12 Id. at6, 7.
13 Id. at 7, 8.
14 State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 122 (Ohio App. 1966).
15 Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
16 Id. at 20 (" [W] e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure.").
17 Id. at 21.
18 Id. at 30.
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In determining whether a stop-and-frisk based on less than proba-
ble cause is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court con-
ducted a balancing test by weighing the government's interest in
crime prevention, which stop-and-frisks promote, against individuals'
personal privacy interests, which such seizures disregard.1 9 In address-
ing the government's interest, the Court discussed the interest in seiz-
ing individuals separately from the governmental interest in frisking
those individuals upon detention. Regarding the issue of the initial
seizure, the Court recognized the governmental interest in crime pre-
vention and detection.20 "The crux of th[e] case," however, was the
propriety of the officer's actions in frisking the individual upon deten-
tion.21 On this issue, the Court identified the strong governmental
interest in allowing police officers to protect themselves against poten-
tially armed individuals; the interest in officer protection is arguably
the main rationale for the Court's creation of this exception to the
traditional probable cause requirement.22 In fact, the Court empha-
sized officer safety as a principal rationale for its holding when it
stated that it was "concerned with more than the governmental inter-
est in investigating crime[s]."23 Indeed, "there is the more immediate
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. '24 To bolster this justifi-
cation for its departure from the traditional probable cause require-
ment, the Court inserted a footnote emphasizing the true danger that
armed criminals pose to police officers on the street; the footnote pro-
vided statistics regarding the number of officers killed, injured, or as-
saulted in the line of duty in a recent year. 25
In emphasizing the governmental interest in crime prevention
and officer safety, however, the Court did not ignore the substantial
interference with personal privacy and security that such stops impli-
cate. It recognized that even a limited search constitutes a substantial
intrusion on personal liberty and that such a search "must surely be an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience."2 6 Nev-
19 Id. at 20-21.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 23.
22 See id. (describing the interest in officer safety as "the more immediate interest");
Tracey Maclin, Teny v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 1271, 1287-88 (1998) ("While the Terry Court was aware of the multiple
purposes served by aggressive patrol practices, the Court chose to emphasize police safety
as the crucial interest to be weighed against the individual's interest in freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures.").
23 Teny, 392 U.S. at 23.
24 Id. (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 24 n.21.
26 Id. at 25.
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ertheless, although acknowledging the interference with individual
rights, the Court held that the balance ultimately struck in favor of the
governmental interest.2 7 Thus, under the Terry doctrine, if a police
officer reasonably suspects that an individual is in the process of com-
mitting a crime or is about to commit a crime, the officer may briefly
detain that individual, try to ascertain whether the individual is
armed, and, if the officer believes that the individual is armed, con-
duct a pat down in areas in which the individual could realistically
hide weapons. The Court held that, under the facts in Terry, the of-
ficer's search did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures: the officer based the
search on his reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and
dangerous, and he confined his search to those areas of the person in
which the individual could hide weapons. 28
Since its decision in Teny, the Court has attempted to shine some
light on several of the cryptic phrases the opinion used-most nota-
bly, the term "reasonable suspicion." It has not, however, provided a
definitive rule for determining the quantum of evidence necessary for
establishing reasonable suspicion.29 Rather, the Court has noted that
"the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less de-
manding than that for probable cause"30 and that the idea of reasona-
ble suspicion is not "'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules."' 31 Commentators have been highly critical of the Court's
failure to adopt a "coherent and practical stop-and-frisk procedure for
law enforcement personnel to follow. 32 The lack of guidance has cre-
ated confusion for both police officers patrolling the streets and for
courts reviewing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify
a decision to stop-and-frisk an individual.33
27 Id. at 27 ("Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of
case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reason-
able search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether
he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.").
28 See id. at 30.
29 See Michael Bell, Note, Caballes, Place, and Economic Rin-tin-tincentives: The Effect of
Canine SniffJurisprudence on the Demand for and Development of Search Technology, 72 BROOK. L.
Rhv. 279, 305 (2006).
30 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citation omitted).
S1 Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
32 EstherJeanette Windmueller, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion-The Demise of Terry v.
Ohio and Individualized Suspicion, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 543 (1991).
33 See, e.g., JIM Ruiz & DON HUMMER, HANDBOOK OF PoLcE ADMINISTRATION 92 (2008)
("Reasonableness (or the lack thereof) is a moving target that is hard to pin down. It is not
a bright line rule, unlike some aspects of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This
makes it difficult for police officers and administrators to know the outer limits of what is
allowed."); Bell, supra note 29, at 305-06 ("The nebulosity of these principles has resulted
in a standard that is so deferential to the judgment of police officers that practically any
articulated justification is sufficient to withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny.").
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In its attempt to provide some guidance, the Court has held that
lower courts should conduct a totality-of-the-circumstances test to de-
termine whether a Terry stop is reasonable. 34 That is, the court must
look to the circumstances under which the officer acted in determin-
ing whether to stop a particular individual.35 Relevant considerations
may include objective observations by the officer, information ob-
tained from police reports, and the patterns of operation of certain
types of criminals. 36 If a court concludes that, from this information,
it was reasonable for an officer to have a "particularized suspicion"37
that the detained individual was involved in criminal activity, then the
officer's suspicion was reasonable, and the stop was therefore
permissible. 38
Although the reasonable-suspicion test is an objective one, and
asks whether the facts that an officer knew at the time of a stop would
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action
taken was appropriate,"39 under a totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach, courts may also take into account the subjective knowledge of
the detaining officer when determining whether a stop was permissi-
ble.4° In fact, in its decision in United States v. Arvizu, the Court explic-
itly held that in determining the reasonableness of a Terry stop, a
court may consider subjective characteristics of the detaining officer,
and held that police officers may "draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information available to them. '41 The subjective com-
ponent of the reasonable-suspicion test came into play in the Court's
holding in Terry, though not explicitly. The Court mentioned the of-
ficer's experience several times throughout its opinion and ultimately
determined that his suspicion that the three men were about to en-
gage in criminal activity was reasonable, especially in light of the
knowledge and experience that the officer had gained from his thirty
years of patrolling the area. 42
34 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); Bell, supra note 29, at 306.
35 Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 (opining that the "whole picture ... must be taken into
account").
36 Id. at 418.
37 Id.
38 See id.; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ("[W]e have required the officers to
have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in
criminal activity.") (citations omitted).
39 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (citations omitted).
40 See Bell, supra note 29, at 306-07.
41 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); see also Bell, supra note 29, at 306-07.
42 See Tey, 392 U.S. at 23 ("It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer
of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood
to have failed to investigate this behavior further.").
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In the post-Terry years, the Court has also addressed several other
questions left open in its decision,43 including when a seizure has ac-
tually occurred 44 and the permissible duration of a Terry stop. 45 One
of the most significant post-Teny cases for purposes of this Note is Ad-
ams v. Williams,46 as it represents the Court's trend of stretching and
extending the contours of the stop-and-frisk doctrine from its original
form. 47 In Adams, the Court addressed the question of whether a po-
lice officer must personally observe potentially criminal behavior to
make a Terry stop, or whether the officer may instead rely on a tip
from a known informant.48 Although the Court declined to adopt a
per se rule, it did hold that stops based on known informants' tips may
sometimes be reasonable; the Court ultimately adopted a case-by-case
standard that takes into account the reliability of the particular tip.49
In some situations, such as the one in Adams, the particular tip may
have enough indicia of reliability such that "the subtleties of the hear-
say rule should not thwart an appropriate police response." 50 The
Court discussed two particular situations in which a Terry stop based
on an informant's tip would be reasonable: first, "when the victim of a
street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his
assailant"; and second, "when a credible informant warns of a specific
impending crime." 51
Adams is significant because, instead of simply reiterating the
Tery doctrine, the Court gave greater power to police by allowing
them to base their reasonable suspicion on the observations of other
43 See Mark W. Malone, Comment, Florida v. J.L.: The United States Supreme Court De-
parts From Its Recent Pattern of Strengthening the Hand of Law Enforcement-A Warning Against
Overly Aggressive Law Enforcement, 27 OLA. Ciry U. L. Rhv. 475, 479 (2002).
44 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (holding that a person is not seized
if "a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his busi-
ness'") (citation omitted).
45 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (holding that a Terry stop "must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop").
46 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
47 See Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual but
Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567, 576-77 (1991) ("[T]he delicate Terry
compromise was short-lived and began to erode as early as 1972 in the case of Adams v.
Williams. There, the Court began not only to backtrack on the minimal requirements es-
tablished for a stop-and-frisk, but also to signal that other factors like time of night, high
crime area, and even race could be used to expand the scope of permissible 'stops and
frisks' under the Terry 'suspicion' standard."); Malone, supra note 43, at 479; The Supreme
Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HAav. L. Rhv. 165, 171 n.59 (1993) ("Since Terry, the
Court has gradually expanded the circumstances that justify a stop and frisk, see, e.g., Ad-
ams v. Williams ... .") (internal citation omitted).
48 See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145, 147.
49 Id. at 147.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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individuals. 52 As one observer notes, Adams "constitutes the first mon-
ster that emerged from Pandora's box."53  Indeed, the decision
opened the door to a line of cases in which the Court continued to
expand the Teny doctrine and strengthen the power of police of-
ficers,54 thereby beginning a trend that ultimately led to the Court's
decision in United States v. Hensley.5 5
Hensley, a case of first impression, addressed whether a Terry stop
based on an officer's reasonable suspicion that the individual had pre-
viously engaged in an already-completed crime was permissible under
the Fourth Amendment. 56 Pre-Hensley decisions implicating the Terry
doctrine concerned only situations in which police officers had
stopped an individual on suspicion that the individual was about to
commit a crime or was committing a crime at the moment of the
stop.57
The Court's prior holdings led it to its decision in Hensley, in
which it disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's "inflexible rule that pre-
cludes police from stopping persons they suspect of past criminal ac-
tivity unless they have probable cause for arrest."58  In Hensley, the
Court explicitly noted that dicta from several of its past decisions had
suggested that stops based on an officer's reasonable suspicion of past
criminal activity were not necessarily per se invalid under the Fourth
52 See id. at 151 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("I share with Judge Friendly a concern that
the easy extension of Teny v. Ohio to 'possessory offenses' is a serious intrusion on Fourth
Amendment safeguards. 'If it is to be extended to the latter at all, this should be only
where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows "that
criminal activity may be afoot."'") (internal citations omitted); id. at 162 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (arguing against the extension of Terry and noting that "[als a result of [the Ad-
ans] decision, the balance struck in Terry is now heavily weighted in favor of the
government"); Malone, supra note 43, at 479.
53 Windmueller, supra note 32, at 549.
54 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983) (holding that its decision
in Tery and its application of Tery in various contexts compelled the conclusion that "the
search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a
weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable
belief ... that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of
weapons"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 106-07 (1977) (per curiam) (allowing an
officer, upon lawfully stopping a vehicle, to order the driver out of the car and, upon
observing a bulge in the individual's pants, pat down the individual to determine whether
the bulge was a hidden weapon); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
(upholding traffic check-points over a Terry challenge); see also Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (relying on Terry in holding that, incident to an arrest, it is reasonable
for the arresting officer to search "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain pos-
session of a weapon or destructible evidence").
55 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
56 See id. at 227.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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Amendment.5 9 The Court ultimately adopted the same reasonable-
ness test that was already in use for stops based on suspicion of immi-
nent or ongoing crimes to govern stops for completed crimes.6° Under
this approach, the Court balanced the "nature and quality of the in-
trusion on personal security against the importance of the govern-
mental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."6 1
In conducting this balancing test, the Court contrasted the gov-
ernmental interests promoted by Terry stops for imminent or ongoing
crimes with stops for already-completed criminal activity. In particu-
lar, it noted that Terry stops to investigate ongoing or imminent crimi-
nal activity promote the strong governmental interest in crime
prevention and detection, unlike stops to investigate past crimes.62
The exigent circumstances that require police officers to intercept an
individual who is about to commit a crime do not exist if the individ-
ual has already completed the crime because there is nothing more to
prevent; the act has already been completed.63 Moreover, the public's
safety is not as threatened by an individual who has engaged in past
criminal activity but who is presently "going about his lawful business
[as] it is by a suspect who is currently in the process of violating the
law."'64 Finally, the Court noted that officers who make a stop to inves-
tigate completed crimes may have a greater ability to choose the time,
place, and circumstances of the stop.65
Although acknowledging the factors that tend to lessen the gov-
ernment's interest in detaining individuals for having already alleg-
edly completed a crime, the Court also discussed the law enforcement
interests that such stops might promote. The ability of police officers
to briefly detain an individual who they believe committed a crime
and who they have had difficulty locating "promotes the strong gov-
ernment interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to jus-
tice."66 Furthermore, prohibiting police action until probable cause
exists allows the individual time to flee, thereby continuing to act as a
threat to the public's safety. 6 7 In highlighting the governmental and
59 Id. Hensley cites the second footnote in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 n.2
(1981), which stated that, "[o]f course, an officer may stop and question a person if there
are reasonable grounds to believe that person is wanted for past criminal conduct." The
Court also cites to its decision in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), where it held
that a police officer may stop a person "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 702.
60 Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 228-29.
66 Id. at 229.
67 See id.
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societal interest in solving crime, the Court noted that this interest was
particularly strong "in the context of felonies or crimes involving a
threat to public safety."'68 The Court ultimately concluded that in situ-
ations in which the alleged crime was particularly violent and danger-
ous and in which the individual sought constituted a continuing
threat to public safety, the law enforcement interests outweigh the in-
dividual's interest in being "free of a stop and detention that is no
more extensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or
ongoing crimes."69
The most relevant part of the Court's decision is its explicit re-
fusal to decide whether the Hensley rule applies to "Terry stops to inves-
tigate all past crimes, however serious."'70 By deliberately addressing
only the issue of completed felonies and not determining whether the
Terry balancing test applies to detentions for past misdemeanors, the
Court left that question open for lower federal and state courts to
address. 7' In the years following Hensley, the Court has not answered
this question. 72 As the following Part explains, a variety of approaches
have developed.
II
THE LOWER FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS ANSWER
HENSLEY'S OPEN QUESTION
Thus far, three circuit courts of appeal have addressed the proper
boundaries of the Hensley decision; in doing so, they have diverged on
the issue. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have both held that the Hens-
ley decision should extend to apply to investigative stops of completed
misdemeanors, and that such stops may be reasonable and acceptable
under the Fourth Amendment if the governmental interests at play
outweigh the privacy interests inherently implicated by such stops.73
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, noted, albeit in dicta, that
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. (emphasis added).
71 Id. ("It is enough to say that, if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in
connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that
suspicion."); see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the
Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 615 (2005)
("Dicta in United States v. Hensley suggest that completed crimes less serious than a felony
would not permit the use of Terry stop-and-frisk powers. ... ); William A. Schroeder,
Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations-Warrantless Entries Into
Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. Rhv. 439, 442 (1990) (discussing the
Court's decision not to address the issue of misdemeanors).
72 See David A. Moran, Traffic Stops, Littering Tickets, and Police Warnings: The Case for a
Fourth Amendment Non-Custodial Arrest Doctrine, 37 AM. CRuM. L. Rhv. 1143, 1158 (2000).
73 See United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1141-43 (10th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1076-77, 1083 (9th Cir. 2007).
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" [p] olice may... make a stop when they have reasonable suspicion of
a completed felony, though not of a mere completed
misdemeanor. ''74
The completed misdemeanor at issue in the Tenth Circuit case of
United States v. Moran was trespassing.75 There, the court applied the
balancing approach from Hensley by weighing the intrusion on per-
sonal liberty against the governmental interests justifying the intru-
sion, and concluded that the investigatory stop was reasonable under
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 76 In apply-
ing the balancing test, the Tenth Circuit noted that the underlying
crime "posed an ongoing risk to public safety" and, therefore, impli-
cated the strong governmental interest in "solving crime and bringing
offenders tojustice."'77 The court furtherjustified its decision by men-
tioning three factors that tended to increase the governmental inter-
est in detaining Moran: first, inherent in a criminal trespass is the risk
of confrontation with the owner of the property; second, because Mo-
ran was trespassing in order to hunt in the neighboring public lands, a
reasonable officer could assume that he was carrying a weapon; third,
because the property owners had already made two police reports that
Moran was trespassing, the officers could reasonably assume that the
illegal activity would recur.78
In the same breath, however, the court recognized the factors
tending to undercut the strength of the governmental interest. For
instance, the officers knew Moran and could have obtained a warrant
and located him later that same day at his house. 79 The court none-
theless held that this fact did not substantially reduce the strength of
the governmental interest and that, regardless of the existence of al-
ternative measures, restraining police action in such a situation would
"require police to turn their backs on potential criminal activity and to
'enable the suspect to flee."' 80 Furthermore, when the officers
74 Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004) (cita-
tions omitted).
75 503 F.3d at 1138-39. The specific facts of Moran are as follows: The Fergusons
made two reports to the local police department that an individual, Moran, was trespassing
on their property, which bordered a national forest. Id. at 1138. Licensed individuals were
permitted to hunt on these public lands, and it was hunting season at the time. Id. Upon
arriving at the property, the responding officers observed a parked black SUV that they
suspected belonged to Moran. Id. While talking to the Fergusons, the black SUV pulled
out and began to drive away. Id. at 1139. One of the officers then pulled the vehicle over
and, upon approaching the SUV, noticed the butt of a rifle stock in the back seat. Id.
Ultimately, the officers arrested Moran on an unrelated warrant, and he was subsequently
indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id.
76 Id. at 1141-42.
77 Id. at 1142.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)).
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stopped Moran, he was more representative of an "individual in the
process of violating the law or a suspect fleeing from the scene of a
crime than 'a suspect in a past crime who now appears to be going
about his lawful business."'81
The stop at issue in Moran was an investigatory automobile stop,
which, under the court's balancing test, did not implicate strong pri-
vacy concerns.8 2 The court pointed out that such traffic stops are
"'brief'" and "'non-intrusive,'" 83 and, consequently, because the in-
trusion on personal privacy was minimal, the governmental interest
outweighed any privacy concerns. 84 The balance having struck in
favor of the government, the court held that the investigatory stop of
Moran was not unreasonable and therefore not violative of the Fourth
Amendment.8 5 Hence, under the Tenth Circuit's approach in Moran,
the reasonableness of a Terry stop for a completed crime will turn on
whether "the alleged underlying criminal activity pose [s] an ongoing
risk to public safety"86 and the type of stop conducted (i.e., whether
it's an on-the-street stop-and-frisk or a brief investigatory automobile
search) .87 Furthermore, in the Tenth Circuit, whether the police of-
ficers had alternative means of locating and investigating the suspect
is of minimal consequence. 88 The fact that obtaining a warrant and
locating Moran later in the day would have been a simple task for the
police officers was not determinative for the court; rather, the court
was concerned more with the ability of the defendant to flee.8 9
The Ninth Circuit, which similarly extended Hensley to apply in
the case of completed misdemeanors, took an interesting and instruc-
tive approach to the question in United States v. Grigg.9° Rather than
blindly applying the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test,
the circuit court explicitly inserted another element into the equa-
tion-the nature of the underlying offense at issue.91 In Grigg, the
crime occasioning the stop was not dangerous and was entirely nonvi-
olent; the police detained the defendant in his vehicle for playing his
81 Id. at 1143 (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228).
82 See id. at 1138-39, 1143.
83 Id. at 1143 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir.
2004)).
84 Id. ("Balanced against the strong governmental interest in solving crime, the rela-
tively limited intrusion on personal security occasioned by an investigatory stop was war-
ranted and the officers' seizure of Mr. Moran was not unreasonable.").
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1142.
87 Id. at 1143.
88 See id. at 1142 (acknowledging that alternative means of investigating the crime
existed, but nevertheless explaining that such alternative methods did not sufficiently de-
tract from the governmental interests promoted by detaining Moran).
89 Id.
90 498 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007).
91 Id. at 1081.
[Vol. 94:13211332
LIMITING THE USE OF TERRY STOPS
car stereo too loudly and thus violating a local noise ordinance. 92 Spe-
cifically, the court adopted the rule that when applying the Hensley
balancing test to stops to investigate completed misdemeanors, courts
"must consider the nature of the misdemeanor offense in question. ' 93
Clarifying this approach, the Ninth Circuit instructed courts that, in
considering the nature of the underlying offense, they should take
into account "the potential for ongoing or repeated danger (e.g.,
drunken and/or reckless driving), and any risk of escalation (e.g., dis-
orderly conduct, assault, domestic violence)," as well as the availability
of "alternative means to identify the suspect or achieve the investiga-
tive purpose of the stop. '94 The court's concern in adopting this ap-
proach was with public safety-the more inherently dangerous the
misdemeanor, the greater the threat to public safety implicated by fail-
ing to detain the individual.95 Under such a scenario, the balance
swings in favor of detention, as the interest in maintaining the safety
of society outweighs the intrusion on personal liberties that such de-
tentions cause. Thus, in the case at hand, the officer's detention of
Grigg did not promote the government's interest in keeping the pub-
lic safe and was therefore unreasonable; even if Grigg had continued
to play his loud music, no threat to the public safety would result.96
Although noting that some state court decisions had relied on
the traditional misdemeanor-felony distinction to limit Hensley to stops
for completed felonies, the Ninth Circuit's opinion explicitly declined
to adopt such a per se rule against the use of Terry stops for all com-
pleted misdemeanors. 97 Its decision not to adopt a per se rule was
due to its concern with overinclusiveness; such a rule would prohibit
stops for completed misdemeanors that police may reasonably con-
sider to be a threat to the public safety, such as reckless driving.9S
In contrast to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit, in
Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Township,99 declined to extend the Hens-
ley analysis to past misdemeanor situations, at least in the context of
vehicle stops. Gaddis did not involve a stop for a completed misde-
92 Id. at 1072.
93 Id. at 1081.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1077-81.
98 Id at 1081. ("Despite the misdemeanor-felony distinction, and the fact that some
courts have relied on this distinction to limit Hensley, we decline to adopt a per se standard
that police may not conduct a Tery stop to investigate a person in connection with a past
completed misdemeanor simply because of the formal classification of the offense. We
think it depends on the nature of the misdemeanor. Circumstances may arise where the
police have reasonable suspicion to believe that a person is wanted in connection with a
past misdemeanor that the police may reasonably consider to be a threat to public
safety.").
99 364 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2004).
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meanor; rather, the misdemeanor at issue was ongoing.100 It was
therefore unnecessary for the Sixth Circuit to delve into a sophisti-
cated and in-depth analysis of the application of Hensley to investiga-
tive stops for completed misdemeanors. Instead, the court addressed
the issue in a footnote that summarized its current Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence on vehicle stops.10 1 In this footnote, the court
stated that although police may stop an individual based on a reasona-
ble suspicion that the individual participated in a completed felony,
police may not make a stop of an individual that they reasonably sus-
pect had participated in an already-completed misdemeanor.10 2
It is noteworthy that the Sixth Circuit's statement was made in the
context of describing its jurisprudence on vehicle stops. As my pro-
posed approach in this Note does distinguish between stops on the
street and stops for dangerous-driving misdemeanors, one might won-
der whether the court intended to limit its rule to traffic stops; that is,
does the Sixth Circuit's jurisprudence prohibit police officers from
ever making investigative stops for past misdemeanors or only from
doing so for traffic violations amounting to misdemeanors? Although
for support the court cited to Hensley, which did not limit its decision
to stops for traffic offenses, 10 3 the analysis of the case centered on
investigative stops for traffic offenses; more specifically, stops to inves-
tigate suspected drunk driving.10 4 All of the cases to which the court
cited dealt with questions concerning the appropriate standard for
evaluating traffic stops.' 0 5 Moreover, the court explained in the foot-
note that it was "summariz[ing] the state of [its] Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence on vehicle stops." 10 6 Thus, a strong argument exists
that the Sixth Circuit intended for its per se rule against the extension
of Hensley to apply only to vehicle stops for completed misdemeanors.
As I will discuss later, due to the inherent differences between investi-
gatory traffic stops and stop-and-frisks on the street, one could sensibly
believe that the court intended to treat the two differently.10 7
100 Id. at 766-68, 770.
101 Id. at 771 n.6.
102 Id. ("Police may make an investigative stop of a vehicle when they have reasonable
suspicion of an ongoing crime, whether it be a felony or misdemeanor, including drunk
driving in jurisdictions where that is a criminal offense. Police may also make a stop when
they have reasonable suspicion of a completed felony, though not of a mere completed
misdemeanor.") (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
103 See id.
104 Id. at 768-70 (discussing the legal standard applied in prior Sixth Circuit cases that
analyzed the brief stop of a vehicle on suspicion of drunk driving, ultimately holding that
the standard of reasonableness governs the stop of Gaddis's vehicle).
105 Id. at 770-71 (citing United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722
(8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Roberts, 986 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1993)).
106 Id.
107 See infra Part III.
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In contrast to the small number of federal circuit courts that have
decided the question that Hensley left open, the number of state court
decisions addressing the issue is substantial.'1  In light of the dearth
of federal circuit case law, the reasoning and analyses that these state
courts have employed is useful in developing a broad rule for all juris-
dictions. Furthermore, because the state courts draw on the specific
criminal statutes of the states in which they sit, they provide an impor-
tant tool for determining the landscape of the criminal law across va-
ryingjurisdictions. The state courts' approaches generally parallel the
approaches of the circuit courts that have addressed the issue; some
have declined to extend Hensley to stops for completed misdemeanors,
while others have permitted such stops upon a finding that they were
reasonable under the Hensley balancing approach. These decisions
turn both on the way in which the court interprets the Hensley deci-
sion and the way in which the state legislature distinguishes felonies
from misdemeanors.1 0 9 The following Part draws specifically from the
Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision in Blaisdell v. Commissioner of
Public Safety,110 in which the court declined to extend Hensley and
adopted a per se approach against stops for completed
misdemeanors.
108 See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 520 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. App. 1988) (per curiam) (af-
firming trial court's holding that Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors are
per se unreasonable under Fourth Amendment); State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 703-04
(La. App. 1986) (holding that Hensley test, balancing the nature and quality of the intru-
sion against the governmental interests justifying the intrusion, governs the inquiry of the
reasonableness of a stop for completed misdemeanor); Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety,
375 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that vehicle stops to investigate past
misdemeanors are per se unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment); City of Devils
Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d 466, 472-73 (N.D. 2002) (holding that a Terry stop based
on an officer's suspicion that an individual had committed a misdemeanor offense of disor-
derly conduct was reasonable); see also, e.g., State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 517 (Wash. 2002)
(holding that Terry stops may not be made for completed noncriminal, nontraffic civil
infractions).
109 See, e.g., Myers, 490 So. 2d at 704 (distinguishing the case from Blaisdell by noting
that, unlike the Minnesota legislature, "[t]he Louisiana legislature has not recognized or
made such a distinction" between misdemeanors committed in an officer's presence and
misdemeanors committed outside of the officer's presence); Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883
("We must also acknowledge the disparate legislative treatment accorded felonies and mis-
demeanors."); Duncan, 43 P.3d at 518 ("The Court's focus on preventing crimes, and pro-
moting the interests of justice in arresting felons in Hensley, suggests that the interest in
preventing civil infractions may not be accorded the same weight.").
110 375 N.W.2d at 884. In Blaisdel4 a clerk at the Q-Service Gas Station informed an
officer on routine patrol that a car leaving the station may have been involved in a "no-pay"
gas theft that had occurred approximately two months earlier. Id. at 881. The officer
followed the vehicle; he did not notice any driving violations or careless driving before
pulling the car over in the parking lot of a nearby restaurant. Id Upon pulling Blaisdell
over, the officer detected an odor of alcohol on his breath. The officer gave Blaisdell a
breath test which Blaisdell failed. Id.
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III
ANALYSIS: DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF HENSLEY
The opinion in Blaisdell is instructive, as it provides thoughtful
analysis and strong support for the court's decision to limit the appli-
cation of Hensley and adopt a per se rule prohibiting Terry stops for
completed misdemeanors. Similar to Gaddis, however, although the
Minnesota Court of Appeals' discussion concerning the general dis-
tinction between felonies and misdemeanors and how the legislature
treats them is relevant to a general discussion about the appropriate
application of Hensley to all stops for completed misdemeanors, and
not just vehicle stops, the court nevertheless appears to limit its hold-
ing to investigatory vehicle stops for completed misdemeanors.111
Nonetheless, unlike the Sixth Circuit, which did not discuss its per se
approach, 12 the Blaisdell court, after acknowledging that Hensley ex-
plicitly left the issue open and noting that no Minnesota state court
had yet addressed it, engaged in an analysis of the issue.113
The court began by discussing the inherent differences between
the governmental interests implicated by stops to investigate com-
pleted crimes and stops to investigate imminent and ongoing
crimes.1 4 In analyzing the propriety of extending Hensley to stops for
completed misdemeanors, the Blaisdell court placed great emphasis
on "the disparate legislative treatment accorded felonies and misde-
meanors."115 The court noted that, by definition, misdemeanors are
punished less harshly than gross misdemeanors or felonies.1 16 Fur-
thermore, as the court observed, Minnesota law, like that of other
states, prohibits a police officer from making a warrantless misde-
meanor arrest unless the perpetrator committed the offense in the of-
ficer's presence.1 17  This disparate treatment of felonies and
misdemeanors by the Minnesota state legislature was a strong factor in
the court's decision; indeed, the court noted that the legislature's
treatment of misdemeanor arrests is a "legislative recognition that the
public concerns served by warrantless misdemeanor arrests are in
some degree outweighed by concerns for personal security and lib-
111 See Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004);
Blaisdel 375 N.W.2d at 884 ("We therefore hold that vehicle stops to investigate completed
misdemeanors violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment of the United State Constitution.").
112 See Gaddis, 364 F.3d at 771 n.6.
113 Blaisdel4 375 N.W.2d at 882.
114 Id. at 882-83.
115 Id. at 883.
116 Id.
117 Id. This Minnesota law, codified at MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34(1) (c) (West 2003),
provides that a "peace officer or part-time peace officer who is authorized.., to make an
arrest without a warrant may do so under the following circumstances: (1) when a public
offense has been committed or attempted in the officer's presence; (2) when the person
arrested has committed a felony, although not in the officer's presence."
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erty." 118 Thus, because the law punishes misdemeanors less severely
than felonies and because, under Minnesota state law, a police officer
may not arrest an individual without a warrant for a misdemeanor un-
less that individual committed the offense in the officer's presence,
"the public concerns served by seizures to investigate past misdemean-
ors are less grave than the concerns served by seizures to investigate
past felonies and gross misdemeanors."'119
The opinion continues by discussing the possible governmental
interests advanced by traffic stops to investigate past misdemeanors.
According to the court, such investigatory traffic stops do not advance
the interest in solving crimes to any great degree.1 2° The court based
this conclusion partly on the alternative investigative measures that
police may use in order to derive the same information that a stop of
an automobile may provide. 12' For example, an officer may record
the automobile's license plate number to determine the car owner's
name. 122 Because Minnesota state law did not permit the officer to
arrest Blaisdell, the court opined, "[I] t is difficult to see what informa-
tion, other than the name of the driver, the officer expected to obtain
as a result of the stop." -2 3
The court concluded that, although situations may exist in which
an automobile stop could potentially advance the public interest in
crime solution to a greater degree than the stop at issue, such situa-
tions "will [not] arise in a misdemeanor context with sufficient fre-
quency to appreciably advance the public interest in solving past
crimes."'124 Thus, when considered in the aggregate, the public inter-
est in permitting automobile stops for completed misdemeanors
would not be sufficient to "outweigh the intrusion on the 'motorists'
right to free passage without interruption."125
Although arguably intended to apply only to traffic stops, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals' rationale provides a sound and informa-
118 Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 883-84 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58
(1976)). In evaluating the interference with personal liberty caused by automobile stops,
the court
restate [d] the physical and psychological intrusions recognized in Delaware
v. Prouse. The stop is normally effected 'by means of a possibly unsettling
show of authority[,] interfere [s] with freedom of movement; [is] inconve-
nient, . . . consume[s] time, [and] may create substantial anxiety.' Addi-
tionally, we cannot overlook the potential of legitimizing a technique for
harassment.
Id. at 883 (internal citations omitted).
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tive analysis of the permissible contours of the Hensley decision. The
court focuses on two key factors essential to justify its per se approach
and on which I will now elaborate: first, the traditional and historical
differences between crimes classified as misdemeanors and crimes
classified as felonies, and, second, the state legislature's disparate ap-
proach for punishing misdemeanors and felonies, as well as the legis-
lature's disparate treatment of rules governing arrests for both types
of crimes. Additionally, the efficiency and guidance that such a per se
rule provides is an important consideration that helps justify my pro-
posed rule: balancing tests such as the one that the Court set forth in
Tery provide little guidance to police on routine patrols, fail to accu-
rately inform individuals of their rights in varying situations, and re-
sult in an inefficient system in which courts must conduct case-by-case
analyses. 126
The Supreme Court's treatment of the felony-misdemeanor dis-
tinction is rather inconsistent; the Court has accepted the historical
distinction in some decisions while dismissing it as arbitrary in others.
In Hensley, the Court clearly found the categorization of some crimes
as felonies important enough to draw the line for permissible Terry
stops for completed crimes to those for completed felonies only.127
Nevertheless, in Tennessee v. Garner, decided only several months after
Hensley, the Court characterized the distinction as "highly technical"
and "often arbitrary."128 On the other hand, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, de-
cided the year before the Hensley decision, the Supreme Court implic-
itly recognized the historical distinction when it addressed the warrant
requirement for arrests in the home.1 29 The crime for which the po-
lice made a warrantless home arrest was a "noncriminal, traffic of-
fense"130 that Wisconsin law classified as a "civil forfeiture offense for
which no imprisonment is possible. -131 The Court ultimately held
that, in determining whether an exigency meriting a warrantless entry
into the home exists, an important factor that police officers and
courts must consider is the "gravity of the underlying offense for
126 Cf Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 761-62 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Court's approach will necessitate a case-by-case evaluation of the seriousness of particular
crimes, a difficult task for which officers and courts are poorly equipped.").
127 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
128 471 U.S. 1, 14, 20 (1985).
129 See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749, 752-53. The Court has recognized that as an underlying
principle, "'searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively un-
reasonable."' Id. at 749 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). The
Court further held in Payton, however, that the existence of some exigent circumstances
may act as an exception to the warrant requirement and justify a warrantless arrest in the
home. Payton, 445 U.S. at 583. Thus, warrantless arrests in the home are sharply limited,
absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. See id. at 602.
130 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
131 Id. at 754.
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which the arrest is being made." 13 2 Thus, because of the strong pre-
sumption against warrantless entries and the great intrusion on per-
sonal liberty that they implicate, "application of the exigent-
circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely
be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a mi-
nor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been commit-
ted."133 Although the Court's holding did not draw the line for
permissible warrantless home entries along the felony-misdemeanor
distinction, and rather distinguished between minor and grave crimes,
the Court nonetheless referenced the distinction in its discussion of
lower courts' decisions applying the exigent-circumstances excep-
tion.134 The Court noted that, although several lower courts had al-
lowed warrantless home entries for "major felonies" under certain
circumstances, most lower courts "have refused to permit warrantless
home arrests for nonfelonious crimes."' 135 Thus, although the Court
did not distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors in its holding,
by relying on and acknowledging lower court decisions that did, the
Court implicitly recognized that such a distinction was not entirely
arbitrary or subjective in applying the exigent-circumstances excep-
tion to the rule against warrantless home entries.1 36
The distinction between these two classifications of crimes has its
roots in the common law. At common law, most felonies were punish-
able by death.1 37 Although not all felonies resulted in execution, the
link between death and felony was profound enough for Blackstone to
write that "'[t] he idea of felony is indeed so generally connected with
that of capital punishment, that we find it hard to separate them,"'
and thus "if a statute makes any new offense [a] felony, the law implies
that i[t] shall be punished with death."1 38
Although most crimes formerly punishable by death no longer
are,139 the historical distinction based on punishment is important be-
132 Id. at 753.
133 Id.
134 See id. at 752-53 (citing, among other cases, State v. Guertin, 461 A.2d 963, 970
(Conn. 1983) ("The [exigent-circumstances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of
real and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to the investigation of seri-
ous crimes; misdemeanors are excluded."); People v. Strelow, 292 N.W.2d 517, 521-22
(Mich. App. 1980)).
135 Id. at 752.
136 After citing to state court cases distinguishing between warrantless home entries for
felonious and nonfelonious crimes, the court stated that "without necessarily approving
any of these particular holdings or considering every possible factual situation, we note
that it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor." Id. at
753.
137 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1985).
138 Id. at 13 n.11 (quoting 4 WiLLiAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *98).
139 See id. at 14.
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cause it helps to explain why the majority approach continues to be
that the punishment associated with the commission of a crime,
rather than the actual punishment imposed, determines whether the
law treats the crime as a felony or a misdemeanor. For example, in
most states, a misdemeanor offense refers to all offenses for which the
statute prescribes a punishment other than death or imprisonment in
the state prison.1 4 0  The categorization of an offense as a misde-
meanor, therefore, generally means that a violation of the offense will
result in the imposition of a fine or imprisonment for a brief term in
the localjail. 141 Considering the existence of fifty-two different juris-
dictions in which criminal statutes are enacted and prosecuted, there
can be no one definition of "misdemeanor"; however, it is enough to
recognize that all misdemeanors are "'less than felon[ies] .'"142 Simi-
larly, no universal definition of "felony" exists; however, it is generally
accepted that the term includes any offense punishable by death, im-
prisonment for more than one year, or imprisonment in the state
prison. 143 The California Code, for example, defines a felony as "a
crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state
prison,"1 4 4 and the New York Code defines a felony as any offense "for
which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year may
be imposed."'14-5
The historical and traditional distinction between the treatment
of misdemeanors and felonies led to the "ancient common-law rule
that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a
140 See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 15 (2006); WAYNE R. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAw 34 (4th ed.
2003) ("In the modem codes, it is sometimes provided that a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in the state prison ... is a felony, and that any other crime (i.e., any crime
punishable only by fine or by imprisonment in a local jail or both) is a misdemeanor. The
practical effect of that dividing line is usually such that these statutes indirectly state what
the statutes in almost all other jurisdictions expressly declare: that any crime punishable by
death or imprisonment for more than one year... is a felony and that any other crime is a
misdemeanor."); see, e.g., Eckhardt v. People, 247 P.2d 673, 677 (Colo. 1952); State v.
Myrick, 163 S.E. 803, 804 (N.C. 1932) ("A crime not punishable by death or imprisonment
in the state's prison is a misdemeanor ....").
141 See United States v. Meyers, 143 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D. Alaska 1956); Eckhardt, 247 P.2d
at 677; State v. Pluth, 195 N.W. 789, 791 (Minn. 1923) ("The crime charged against defen-
dant is punishable only by a fine and imprisonment in the county jail, and therefore is not
a felony .. "); BLACK'S LAw DicrioNARY 1020 (8th ed. 2004) (defining misdemeanor as a
"crime that is less serious than a felony and is usu [ally] punishable by fine, penalty, forfei-
ture, or confinement (usu[ally] for a brief term) in a place other than prison (such as a
county jail)"); 22 C.J.S., supra note 140, § 15; LAFAvE, supra note 140, at 34.
142 22 C.J.S., supra note 140, § 15 (citation omitted); see SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 6 (14th ed. 1926) ("'Misdemeanour is to be regarded as
a negative expression, being applied to indictable crimes not falling within the class of
felonies.").
143 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(2) (1985); 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMI
NAL LAw § 19 (15th ed. 1993).
144 Cm.. PENAL, CODE § 17(a) (West 1999).
145 N.Y. PENAl. LAW § 10.00(5) (McKinney 2004).
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misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a fel-
ony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for
making the arrest."'146 As indicated in Blaisdell and several of the other
federal and state courts that have addressed the topic, this common
law rule prevails among the states.' 47 The categorization of crimes as
either felonies or misdemeanors also remains relevant for purposes of
the substantive criminal law, as well as for criminal procedure lawi' 48
In the substantive context, "there are a number of crimes whose ele-
ments are defined, or whose punishment is stated, with reference to
felonies as distinguished from misdemeanors." 149 For example, at
common law, burglary was defined as breaking and entering another's
home at night with the intent to commit a felony; the intent to com-
mit a misdemeanor therein was not enough for conviction. 150
In the procedural context, the number of peremptory challenges
available to the prosecution and defense might depend on the classifi-
cation of the underlying crime being charged. 5 1 Additionally, a de-
fendant charged with a felony must be present at his trial, whereas an
individual charged with the commission of a misdemeanor need not
be.152 Moreover, the statutory period of limitations within which the
prosecution must commence a case may depend upon the classifica-
tion of the crime charged.1 53
146 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976); see also I TORciA, supra note 143,
§ 21.
147 See Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. App. 1985); see
also Watson, 423 U.S. at 419; JOSHUA DRESSI.ER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 10.02 (3d ed. 2002); YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COM-
MENTS AND QUESTIONS 327 (12th ed. 2008) ("Some ... relevant authorities have described
the common law warrantless arrest power of police regarding misdemeanors as having two
limitations: (i) that the offense have occurred in the officer's presence; and (ii) that the
offense constitute a 'breach of the peace."'); Frase, supra note 71, at 615-16 ("A similar
ends proportionality principle underlies the common law rule, still recognized in some
form by most states, forbidding warrantless arrest for misdemeanors not committed within
the arresting officer's presence." (footnote omitted)); William A. Schroeder, Warrantless
Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo. L. Rrv. 771, 777 (1993) ("Most juris-
dictions... retain the in-the-presence rule in some form."). Although the Supreme Court
has not held that the Fourth Amendment requires the "in the presence" rule for warrant-
less misdemeanor arrests, it nonetheless continues to be the prevailing rule among the
states. SeeAtwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 n.11 (2001) ("We need not, and
thus do not, speculate whether the Fourth Amendment entails an 'in the presence' re-
quirement for purposes of misdemeanor arrests."); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756
(1984) (White, J., dissenting) ("'lilt is generally recognized today that the common law
authority to arrest without a warrant in misdemeanor cases may be enlarged by statute, and
this has been done in many of the states."') (citation omitted).
148 See LAFAvr, supra note 140, at 35; Schroeder, supra note 147, at 812-15.
149 LAFAVE, supra note 140, at 35.
150 Id.
151 1 TORcIA, supra note 143, § 21 (noting that a greater number of peremptory chal-
lenges is usually allowed if the crime charged is a felony rather than a misdemeanor).
152 See id.
153 See id. § 92.
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The distinction may have even further implications outside of
substantive and procedural criminal law. In some states, for example,
conviction of a felony may be grounds for divorce, while in others,
felony convictions may subject the individual to the loss of profes-
sional licenses and the right to serve on juries. 5 4 Some jurisdictions
prohibit convicted felons from holding public office. 155 Commenta-
tors, like Professor William Schroeder, have also continued to appreci-
ate the distinction. As Professor Schroeder wrote:
Despite its flaws, the felony/misdemeanor distinction should be ac-
corded constitutional significance. The distinction has deep roots
in the common law and in search and seizure law. It also comports
with contemporary norms. The felony/misdemeanor distinction
has been said to be "[t] he most important classification of crimes in
general use in the United States."156
Indeed, the importance of this distinction is what drove the lower
court decisions referenced in Welsh, as well as several other lower
court decisions deciding the issue of the exigent-circumstances excep-
tion to the rule against warrantless entries.1 57
State legislatures continue to distinguish between felonies and
misdemeanors, a distinction that continues to be determined by the
severity and longevity of the punishment associated with a conviction
of the crime, rather than the actual punishment imposed.15 8 The per-
petuation of this historical distinction suggests that legislatures are
154 See LAFAvE, supra note 140, at 36; Schroeder, supra note 147, at 815 & nn.161, 163.
155 LAFAvr, supra note 140, at 36.
156 Schroeder, supra note 147, at 812-13 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
157 See, e.g., State v. Guertin, 461 A.2d 963, 970 (Conn. 1983) ("The [exigent-circum-
stances] exception is narrowly drawn to cover cases of real and not contrived emergencies.
The exception is limited to the investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are ex-
cluded."); Youtz v. State, 494 So. 2d 189, 192-93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (suggesting that
warrantless entries into homes may only be justified if police have probable cause to be-
lieve that a felony was being committed); People v. Hoffstetter, 470 N.E.2d 1247, 1251-52
(Ill. App. 1984) (holding that odor of marijuana does not justify warrantless entry into a
person's home because it only suggests that a misdemeanor, and not a felony, is being
committed).
158 See United States v. Meyers, 143 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D. Alaska 1956) ("[T]he statute
itself defines the crime as a felony. Regardless of this classification, however, the majority
rule and that which has been applied in this jurisdiction is that where a statute defines an
offense as 'punishable' by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or which offense may be pun-
ished or is liable to be punished by such imprisonment, the offense is a felony, as the
accused is subject to such punishment regardless of the penalty actually imposed."); People
v. Hughes, 32 N.E. 1105, 1106 (N.Y. 1893) ("It is not the actual sentence, but the possible
one, which determines the grade of the offense."); LAFAvr, supra note 140, at 34-35 ("The
typical provision ... uses the word 'punishable' or the phrase 'which may be punished.'
Under a test so worded it is the possible sentence, not the actual sentence imposed, which
controls, by the great weight of authority.... Thus in the United States most criminal
statutes defining specific crimes do not themselves label as felonies or misdemeanors the
crimes which they describe, leaving the matter to be determined by reference to the pun-
ishment provided (according to the place or to the length of confinement).").
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simply less concerned with punishing those who commit misdemean-
ors and removing them from society than they are with punishing fel-
ony offenders. Although several courts and commentators have noted
that the felony-misdemeanor distinction may now be immaterial be-
cause of the inconsistency of state legislatures' categorization of
crimes, 159 this inconsistency does not change the fact that in designat-
ing a crime as a "felony," a legislature is making the determination
that the crime is inherently more serious than crimes it does not des-
ignate as felonies. 160 Thus, even though a crime categorized as a mis-
demeanor in one state may be a felony in another, the most serious
crimes continue to be categorized as felonies in all states.
According to a 2000 survey of approximately 930,000 state felony
convictions, conducted by the Department of Justice's Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics, approximately 3 percent of convictions were for weapon
offenses; approximately 35 percent were for drug offenses, including
possession and trafficking; approximately thirty percent were for
property offenses, including burglary, larceny and fraud; and approxi-
mately twenty percent were for violent offenses, including murder,
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. 161 This survey indicates that
state legislatures continue to understand and appreciate the conse-
quences and stigma that attach to a felony conviction; the most seri-
ous crimes to society continue to be designated as felonies. Under the
approach I advocate, police officers would continue to be able to
make Terry stops based on their reasonable suspicion that an individ-
ual had engaged in any one of these serious and, many times, violent
felonies.
159 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 158 (1925) ("In England at the common law the difference in punishment be-
tween felonies and misdemeanors was very great. Under our present federal statutes, it is
much less important and Congress may exercise a relatively wide discretion in classing
particular offenses as felonies or misdemeanors."); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372
(4th Cir. 1974) (rejecting the common law rule prohibiting warrantless arrests for misde-
meanors committed outside an officer's presence and noting that "[t]he difference be-
tween felonies and misdemeanors is no longer as significant as it was at common law");
Paul R. Rice, Evolving Evidentiary Needs: A Neglected Responsibility, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 657,
668-69 (2006) (arguing that evidentiary rules involving admissibility of prior convictions
should be changed to reflect the idea that "the felony/misdemeanor distinction no longer
has the same meaning").
160 See Henry F. Fradella, Mixed Signals and Muddied Waters: Making Sense of the Propor-
tionality Principle and the Eighth Amendment, 42 CRIM. L. BuI.. 498, 498 (2006) ("We differen-
tiate what is more severe as compared to what is less severe often using nothing more than
common sense. Legislatures do this when they designate offenses as violations, misde-
meanors, and felonies.").
161 MATTHErW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BURFAU OFJUS-
TICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2000, at 6 tbl.1.1 (2003),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scOO01st.pdf. The report lumped to-
gether the remaining approximately fifteen percent of crimes as "other offenses." Id.
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A survey of the 2006 arrest rates in California also helps to high-
light the distinction between misdemeanor and felony offenses that
continues to exist in state codes today. Excluding the arrests for mo-
tor vehicle violations, the greatest number of misdemeanor arrests
were for assault and battery, petty theft, marijuana and other drug
offenses, prostitution, public drunkenness, violations of the liquor
laws, disturbing the peace, vandalism, trespassing, and violations of a
city or county ordinance. 162 The greatest number of felony arrests,
excluding arrests for motor vehicle violations, were for weapons of-
fenses; violent offenses, including homicide, forcible rape, robbery,
assault, and kidnapping; property offenses, including burglary, theft,
motor vehicle theft, and arson; marijuana, narcotics, and dangerous
drug offenses; and sex offenses. 163 With the exception of assault and
battery, none of the most commonly committed misdemeanors in-
volved physical contact or behavior that presents a real threat to the
public safety. 164 Furthermore, in California, assault and battery
against a police officer, or against any individual if it results in serious
bodily injury, may qualify as a felony.1 65 Thus, since the 2006 misde-
meanor arrests for assault and battery were most likely for offenses
that did not result in serious injury to the victim, the classification of
offenses in California indicates that the California legislature contin-
ues to appreciate the historical distinction between felonies and mis-
demeanors: the most dangerous and serious crimes, such as homicide
and forcible rape, continue to be felonies, and those crimes that do
not involve physical contact and do not present a grave threat to soci-
ety continue to be designated as misdemeanors.
Although I do not intend to undermine notions that the felony-
misdemeanor distinction has perhaps lost some of its common law
significance, 66 1 do argue that the distinction continues to be relevant
in the application of Tery to stops for completed misdemeanors. I
argue that, with the exception of the most dangerous driving viola-
tions qualifying as misdemeanors, courts should not extend the Hens-
ley decision to warrantless Terry stops for completed misdemeanors.
By classifying the commission of a crime as a misdemeanor, a legisla-
ture is pronouncing its belief that that crime is not terribly serious and
that a person who commits that crime does not represent a high
threat to society. Thus, that a crime may be a misdemeanor in one
162 See CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CENTER, TOTAL MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS,
tbl.4A (2006), http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc-stats/profO6/O0/4A.htm.
163 See CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS CENTER, TOTAL FELONY ARRESTS, tbl.3A
(2006), http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc-stats/profO6/00/3A.htm.
164 See CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTIC S CENTER, supra note 162, at tbl.4A
(2006), http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc-stats/profO6/00/4A.htm.
165 CAI- PrENAL CODE § 243(a)-(d) (West 2005); see also id. § 17.
166 See sources cited supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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state but a felony in another does not undermine my proposed ap-
proach; Hensley's extension of Terry was justified by the government's
interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice, as well as
detaining an individual who, if allowed to flee, would continue to act
as a threat to the public safety. These governmental interests thatjus-
tified the extension of Terry to stops for completed felonies do not
support a further extension of Terry to stops for completed
misdemeanors.
By designating a crime as a misdemeanor, the legislature has im-
plicitly determined that violators of the statute do not present a great
threat to public safety. In short, the legislature is not terribly con-
cerned with punishing those offenders and isolating them from the
rest of society. Therefore, stops for completed misdemeanors would
not advance the governmental interests in public safety and bringing
offenders to justice to a great enough degree to outweigh the interfer-
ence with personal liberty and security interests that such stops impli-
cate.167 Although the strong privacy interests discussed in Terry and
Hensley continue to exist in the context of stops for completed misde-
meanors, the strong governmental interests do not, and the rule
should not be extended to apply in such situations. Echoing these
concerns, the Washington Supreme Court, in its discussion regarding
its decision not to extend the Terry stop exception to nontraffic civil
infractions, stated:
Accepting the presumption that more serious crimes pose a greater
risk of harm to society, we place an inversely proportional burden in
relation to the level of the violation. Thus, society will tolerate a
higher level of intrusion for a greater risk and higher crime than it
would for a lesser crime. 168
Indeed, as Professor Schroeder noted in an article regarding warrant-
less misdemeanor arrests, "[m]isdemeanors ... are relatively less im-
portant than felonies. It is therefore appropriate that additional
safeguards be imposed and hurdles leaped before an individual can
be subjected to the indignity and inconvenience of an arrest for a mis-
demeanor."169 Similarly, safeguards and hurdles should also be in
place before police officers impose the "indignity and inconvenience"
of a Terry stop. 170
Although many of the federal and state court decisions address-
ing this issue involved investigatory vehicle stops, which the Supreme
167 Cf Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. App. 1985)
(opining that disparate treatment of felonies and misdemeanors by the state legislature is a
"legislative recognition that the public concerns served by warrantless misdemeanor arrests
are in some degree outweighed by concerns for personal security and liberty").
168 State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 518-19 (Wash. 2002).
169 Schroeder, supra note 147, at 825.
170 See id.
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Court has treated as analogous to Terry stops, 171 and which the Court
has noted do not generally implicate as severe privacy concerns as on-
the-street Terry stops, 172 such stops should nonetheless be prohibited.
Initially, it is important to note that most of the lower court decisions
involving vehicle stops were in the context of nondriving misdemean-
ors; thus, although police officers coincidentally made the stops while
the defendants were driving their cars, the stops were intended to in-
vestigate nondriving-related, already-completed misdemeanors.1 73 It
is true that stops of vehicles may not involve any physical contact be-
tween the police officer and the driver and may serve only to allow the
officer to "ask questions[ I] or check identification." 174 Nevertheless,
such vehicle stops, with an exception for stops to investigate danger-
ous driving misdemeanors, should be per se prohibited, as they gener-
ally do not pass muster under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
analysis.
One of the Court's justifications for its holding in Hensley was the
recognition that restraining police action "might... enable the sus-
pect to flee ... and to remain at large. '175 In the context of vehicle
stops for completed misdemeanors, however, this justification is much
less persuasive. Because police officers in most states cannot make a
warrantless arrest of an individual upon pulling that individual over
for a completed misdemeanor not committed in the officer's pres-
171 See Moran, supra note 72, at 1153-55; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002) ("The Fourth Amendment prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' by
the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehi-
cles that fall short of traditional arrest.") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968));
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) ("A routine traffic stop ... is a relatively brief
encounter and 'is more analogous to a so-called "Teny stop"... than to a formal arrest.'")
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).
172 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (explaining that investigatory vehi-
cle stops are "limited [in purpose] and the resulting detention quite brief"); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976) (holding that, in the context of routine
vehicle checkpoint stops, although the stops do "intrude to a limited extent on motorists'
right to 'free passage without interruption,' and arguably on their right to personal secur-
ity," it involves only "a brief detention of travelers" where "[n]either the vehicle nor its
occupants are searched, and visual inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can be seen
without a search") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 879-80 (1975) (describing an automobile stop as a "modest" intrusion); see also
United States v. Moran, 504 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10th Cir. 2007).
173 See, e.g., Moran, 504 F.3d at 1138-39 (criminal trespass); City of Dodge City v. Had-
ley, 936 P.2d 1347, 1354 (Kan. 1997) (disorderly conduct); Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub.
Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 881 (Minn. App. 1985) (suspicion of gasoline theft from two
months earlier); State v. Hayes, 640 A.2d 288, 289-90 (N.H. 1994) (police observed driver
"yelling and gesturing" and eyewitness told police defendant "had kicked over a parking
sign"); City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d 466, 567-69 (N.D. 2002) (disorderly
conduct).
174 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
175 Id.
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ence, 176 "the prospect of bringing the suspect to justice is not immedi-
ately advanced."1 7 7 Furthermore, in situations in which the
underlying offense does not threaten public safety, no exigency exists
that warrants an immediate Terry stop of the individual "at the ex-
pense of alternative investigative methods," including "run[ning] a
routine license check," which "is a standard procedure for gathering
information about a suspected violation of the law.'1 78 Thus, al-
though vehicle stops to investigate completed misdemeanors might
implicate less severe privacy concerns than stop-and-frisks conducted
on the street, restraining immediate police action while other alterna-
tive investigative measures are employed does not threaten public
safety to a degree sufficient to warrant such stops. Furthermore, be-
cause in most jurisdictions an officer would not be able to make a
warrantless arrest of the detained individual if the misdemeanor was
not completed in the officer's presence, it is difficult to see what infor-
mation an officer would be able to gather as a result of the stop other
than the name of the driver, which can be obtained by recording the
license plate numbers.1 79
The Supreme Court's treatment of traffic stops as analogous to
Terry stops further justifies the rule against investigative traffic stops
for completed misdemeanors. Because of its determination that the
Terry doctrine governs traffic stops, the Court held in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms that if a police officer lawfully stops a vehicle, so long as the
officer has reason to believe that the driver is armed, that officer may
routinely order the driver out of the vehicle and briefly pat the driver
down in areas in which weapons may be hidden. 8 0 Thus, although
the Court and commentators have recognized that routine traffic
stops may constitute less of a threat to personal liberty than stops on
the street, because the Terry doctrine governs such stops, a police of-
ficer may lawfully order the individual out of the car, thereby forcing
him or her to engage in a face-to-face confrontation.' 8 1 Moreover,
assuming that the officer believes that the individual is armed, the
176 See sources cited supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
177 Blaisdel4 375 N.W.2d at 883.
178 United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1082, 1083 (9th Cir. 2007); see also State v.
Bennett, 520 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. Dist. App. 1988) (Glickstein, J., concurring) (per
curiam) ("The police unquestionably could not have arrested their suspect, even if he had
confessed. The police were not trying to obtain evidence from a third party witness whom
they might not otherwise be able to find. They were trying to obtain information from the
suspect himself whom if they wished to charge, would have to find him again [sic].").
179 See Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883.
180 434 U.S. 106, 110-12 (1977) (per curiam).
181 See id. at 110 ("Establishing a face-to-face confrontation diminishes the possibility,
otherwise substantial, that the driver can make unobserved movements[;] this, in turn,
reduces the likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault.").
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officer has the right to frisk the driver's outer clothing.18 2 Accord-
ingly, under prevailing case law, it is entirely possible that if police
officers making traffic stops were permitted to investigate past misde-
meanors, these stops could escalate to face-to-face confrontation and
physical contact between the officer and the driver.
Under a per se approach against all Terry stops for completed
misdemeanors, an exception exists for the most dangerous of traffic
violations amounting to misdemeanor offenses. Using the California
Penal Code as an example, the approach recognizes such an excep-
tion due to the continuing harm to public safety that these types of
crimes present. Although privacy concerns are implicated by such
traffic stops, especially considering the fact that the risk of escalation
to face-to-face confrontation and physical contact between the driver
and detaining officer still exists, the balance nevertheless weighs in
favor of allowing such detentions, as the governmental interest in pro-
tecting other drivers and pedestrians from dangerous or reckless driv-
ing outweighs the interest in protecting personal security and privacy.
An example of a dangerous driving misdemeanor to which this excep-
tion would apply is the crime of driving under the influence. Under
California law, for example, driving under the influence ("DUI") may
classify as a misdemeanor depending upon the circumstances of the
offense. The relevant provisions classify a first-time DUI offense as a
misdemeanor that may result in a maximum of six months imprison-
ment in the countyjail.18 3 Although a misdemeanor and not punisha-
ble by imprisonment in the state prison under California law, driving
while under the influence of drugs or alcohol obviously represents a
threat to the public. Therefore, under this approach, a police officer
may make an investigatory stop of an automobile based on the of-
ficer's reasonable suspicion that the already-completed misdemeanor
is a dangerous driving offense, such as DUI or reckless driving.
The dangerous-driving exception has limits, however, and in that
sense, represents a reasonableness-under-the-circumstances test. If
the officer reasonably suspects that a driver committed a DUI offense
three days ago, making an investigatory traffic stop of that individual is
no longer justified; the amount of time that has passed makes such a
182 See id. at 111-12.
185 See Cm.. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 2000) (driving under the influence); id.
§ 23536(a) ("If a person is convicted of a first violation of Section 23152, that person shall
be punished by imprisonment in the countyjail for not less than 96 hours, at least 48 hours
of which shall be continuous, nor more than six months and by a fine of not less than three
hundred ninety dollars ($390), nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000)."); see also
CA. PENAL, CODE § 17(a) (West 1999) ("A felony is a crime which is punishable with death
or by imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime or public offense is a misde-
meanor .... "); id. § 19 ("[E]very offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both.").
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stop unreasonable, as those actions of the driver no longer endanger
the public and, therefore, the governmental interest in public safety is
insufficient to outweigh the costs to personal security. If, however, the
officer reasonably suspects that an individual currently operating a
moving vehicle had been driving under the influence three hours ear-
lier, an investigatory stop of that individual might be reasonable. Al-
though it will require a case-by-case adjudication of the temporal
issue, the dangerous-driving exception to the per se approach that I
advocate in this Note is necessary due to the risk to the public that
such crimes present. In the aggregate, the governmental interest in
public safety that investigatory traffic stops for the most dangerous
driving misdemeanors would promote outweighs the privacy interests
inherent in such stops.
Returning again to the general per se rule against extending
Hensley to stops for completed misdemeanors, and considering the
fact that the categorization of crimes and the punishments that go
along with them vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, one might ar-
gue that a somewhat modified per se rule prohibiting all stops for
completed misdemeanors is either undesirable or unnecessary. The
need for a per se rule is strong, however, as it generally avoids "point-
less litigation concerning the nature and gradation of various
crimes."'184 Applying the Hensley balancing test to situations involving
stops for completed misdemeanors would "necessitate a case-by-case
evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes,"'18 as well as "ham-
per law enforcement [efforts] ."186
In its decision in Grig, the Ninth Circuit applied the Hensley bal-
ancing test and also inserted the factor of the gravity of the underlying
offense in question. 187 Under this approach, if the misdemeanor in
question is not particularly dangerous or serious, the stop is unreason-
able.188 Engaging in a case-by-case balancing test, however, in which
courts and police officers must consider the gravity of the particular
offense at hand "requires [police officers] to engage in an even more
sophisticated balancing of imprecise and often conflicting factors at a
time when prompt action is, by definition, necessary." 89 Although I
advocate in this Note for an exception to the per se rule for danger-
ous traffic violations that would allow police to make reasonable stops
184 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 760-61 (1984) (White, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 761-62.
186 Id. at 760.
187 United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007).
188 See id. ("Although the Supreme Court did not expressly limit its holding, the rea-
soning of Hensley suggests that we may properly consider the gravity of the offense in bal-
ancing the interest of crime prevention and investigation against the interest in privacy and
personal security when a court assesses the reasonableness of a Tery stop.").
189 Schroeder, supra note 71, at 491.
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to investigate completed dangerous-driving misdemeanors (with rea-
sonability depending on the temporal factor), my proposed general
rule nonetheless provides more guidance for officers patrolling the
streets than the Ninth Circuit's approach that factors in the gravity of
the offense. Although the Ninth Circuit's balancing approach might
lead to the same result-stops for completed dangerous driving viola-
tions weigh heavily in the balance-my approach nonetheless pro-
vides for more guidance to police officers and less balancing by the
courts.
Under this Note's rule, police officers would know that they may
never make a Terry stop on the street based on their reasonable suspi-
cion that an individual was engaged in a past misdemeanor. Further-
more, officers patrolling the roads similarly would know that they may
only make vehicle stops for a limited and predetermined number of
dangerous driving violations. Depending on the driving offenses
criminalized as misdemeanors in a police officer's jurisdiction, the of-
ficer would know ahead of time which driving offenses qualify as dan-
gerous, thereby falling under the exception. Thus, all the police
officer would need to do is factor in the amount of time that has
elapsed since the individual engaged in the past conduct. Police of-
ficers patrolling the roads therefore would have enough guidance to
know when an investigatory traffic stop was permissible-considering
the temporal proximity of the past crime is a task that police officers
are more than equipped to handle.
In addition to providing guidance to police officers on patrol,
this approach allows individuals to more easily understand their rights
in given circumstances. As the Supreme Court noted in Oliver v.
United States,190 "an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amend-
ment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances" cre-
ates difficulties for courts, police, and citizens. 19 1 Should the Teriy
balancing approach be further extended to stops for completed mis-
demeanors, the situations in which individuals are uncertain of their
Fourth Amendment rights will only increase. Given the weakness of
the governmental interest in stops for completed misdemeanors, an
approach under which individuals know their rights ahead of time
and can appreciate when a stop by a police officer is unlawful will add
further clarity to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
State legislatures continue to appreciate and apply the historical
common law distinction between crimes categorized as felonies and
190 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
191 Id. at 181.
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those categorized as misdemeanors. Although consistency among all
fifty-two jurisdictions is lacking, each individual jurisdiction catego-
rizes a crime as either a felony or a misdemeanor based on its own
determinations and beliefs about the seriousness and gravity of the
offense. Although a misdemeanor in one state may be a felony in
another, the designation of a crime as a misdemeanor in a given juris-
diction generally indicates that the legislature in that jurisdiction be-
lieves that the perpetrator of such a crime does not present a strong
threat to public safety. Indeed, it is this distinction that the Minnesota
Court of Appeals relied on to adopt a per se rule prohibiting all inves-
tigative vehicle stops for past misdemeanor offenses. In so holding,
the court reasoned that the aggregate governmental interests that
such stops would promote did not outweigh the severe interference
with personal liberty that such stops implicate. This court was correct:
the governmental interests in solving crimes and bringing offenders
to justice that justified the Court's extension of Terry in the Hensley
decision do not support the further extension of Terry to stops for
completed misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are, by definition, less seri-
ous offenses than felonies, and the public interest in bringing such
offenders to justice is not high enough to outweigh the strong privacy
interests implicated by Terry stops.
In the case of dangerous-driving misdemeanors, however, the
governmental interest in protecting other drivers on the road and
pedestrians on the street outweighs the privacy interests implicated by
a vehicle stop. For an already-completed DUI, for example, if the au-
tomobile stop is made in a timely fashion, then such a stop is permissi-
ble and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The approach I advocate in this Note provides clear guidance to
police officers patrolling our communities. It also sufficiently apprises
individuals of their Fourth Amendment rights in advance of a Terry
stop. In the end, a rule prohibiting stops for misdemeanors that have
already been completed, with an exception for dangerous-driving mis-
demeanors, recognizes the inherent status of misdemeanors as less se-
rious and dangerous offenses, as well as promotes judicial efficiency
and gives greater guidance to police officers patrolling the streets.
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